메인 International Journal Middle East Studies Everett Mendelsohn, A Compassionate Peace: A Future for the Middle East (Middlesex, England:...
문제 보고This book has a different problem? Report it to us
"네" 선택하시는 조건: "네" 선택하시는 조건: "네" 선택하시는 조건: "네" 선택하시는 조건:
파일 열기 성공했습니다
파을 내용은 책 (또는 만화)입니다
책 내용이 적당합니다
파일의 제목, 작성자와 언어가 책 설명과 일치합니다. 다른 필드는 보조이므로 무시하셔도 좋습니다.
"아니요" 선택하시는 조건: "아니요" 선택하시는 조건: "아니요" 선택하시는 조건: "아니요" 선택하시는 조건:
- 잘못된 파일입니다
- 이 파일이 DRM으로 보호돼 있습니다
- 파일은 책이 아닙니다 (예: xls, html, xml)
- 파일은 기사입니다
- 파일은 책에 일부입니다
- 파일은 잡지입니다
- 파일은 시험지 또는 테스트입니다
- 파일은 스팸입니다
책의 내용이 적당하지 않으며 차단되어야 한다고 생각합니다
파일의 제목, 작성자와 언어가 책 설명과 일치하지 않습니다. 다른 필드는 무시하셔도 좋습니다.
Change your answer
394 Reviews minimized the importance of kinship, arms maintenance, and autonomous political organization. Yet agricultural Bakhtiyari are described as tribal: "Whole tayafahs, for example the Janiki Garmsir, were settled" (p. 24). We are presented with two forms of Bakhtiyari socioeconomic organization that complement one another ecologically but are structurally distinct. The distinctions are minimized in the author's analysis of multiresource exploitation of the ecologically complex southern Zagros region. Garthwaite has achieved a complex picture of the component parts of the Bakhtiyari confederation in relation to their physical environment, but he has not shown how these parts are interrelated. Thus, questions concerning the relationship of settled agriculture to pastoral nomadism in developing tribal political structures at all levels of the hierarchy, the role of agricultural and livestock surplus in maintaining tribal elites, and the existence or nonexistence of classes among the Bakhtiyari are all defined as outside of this study, perhaps because of the author's more immediate historical concerns. Indeed, the discussion of "The khans and the tribal structure" (pp. 34-46) collapses settled agriculture into pastoral nomadism when analyzing the hierarchical political structure of the confederacy. This criticism, however, should not minimize the richness and theoretical subtlety that characterizes the description and analysis of the Bakhtiyari adaptations to the exigencies of life in the Zagros mountains. In the historical sections the author does not simply add the Bakhtiyari to existing Iranian history. Rather, he reconstructs that history through the inclusion of the Bakhtiyari and their leaders. In addition, he provides a regional overview that includes other major tribal groups and confederations, the governments of Isfahan and Shiraz, and foreign (mainly British) interests and involvements. Nowhere is the importance of this regional approach more apparent than in the discuss; ion of the Constitutional period, the discovery of oil, and the Anglo-Russian accord of 1907. This is perhaps the best description available of the tensions between fragmentation and unity in Iran that lasted until well into the reign of the first Pahlavi shah. The Duraki khans are presented as walking a tightrope among personal, tribal, and national interests. Portrayed as neither villains nor heroes, they emerge as reasonable but ill-equipped men trying to deal with insurmountable problems during a period of political instability exaggerated by foreign intrigue. The author has had access to the private libraries of some of the most important of the Duraki khans. The forty-five royal firmans and personal documents that are included in microfiche provide not only documentary reinforcement for this work, but also will be a valuable source for future scholars. One wonders, however, how much the microfiche added to the high price of this volume. In conclusion, this is a fine, detailed study of the Bakhtiyari in Iranian politics that is necessary reading for anyone concerned with tribalism in Iran. Combined with Digard's studies on the ethnology and technology of Bakhtiyari nomadic life, we now have a fuller picture of the Bakhtiyari than of any other tribal group in Iran. When added to the excellent studies by Tapper on the Shahsevan, Loeffler on the Boir Admad Lurs, von Bruinesson on the Kurds, and Beck's forthcoming study of the Qashqai, Khans and Shahs greatly expands the body of cross-disciplinary scholarship on tribalism in Iran that is unmatched in any other region of Middle Eastern studies. Western Washington University LEONARD HELGFOTT EVERETT MENDELSOHN, A Compassionate Peace: A Future for the Middle East (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1982). Pp. 236. Reviews 395 KHALIL NAKHLEH and CLIFFORD A. WRIGHT, After the Palestine-Israel War: Limits to U.S. and Israeli Policy (Belmont, Mass.: Institute of Arab Studies, 1983). Pp. 156. MOHAMMED K. SHADID, The United States and the Palestinians (London: Croom Helm, 1981). Pp. 252. SAADIA TOUVAL, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982). Pp. 391. In a follow-up to its excellent 1970 study (Search for Peace in the Middle East), the American Friends Service Committee published in 1982 A Compassionate Peace (based on a report of an able Working Party), which provides a perceptive, in-depth discussion and analysis not only of the Arab-Israeli conflict but also of (1) those Middle Eastern problems related to Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, oil, and the arms race; and (2) American and Soviet policies in the Middle East. The book is especially valuable because first, it deals knowledgeably and objectively with these problems in all of their complexities (including both the internal and external forces, and factors that helped create them); and second, it provides extensive documentation and useful maps, bibliography, and appendix. As in the 1970 study, A Compassionate Peace considers the Palestinian question to be the "core" of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It contends that any lasting peace settlement requires an effective and enlightened American involvement and must be based on (1) the withdrawal, security, and other principles contained in Security Council Resolution 242; (2) the right of the Palestinians to national self-determination; (3) mutual recognition; and (4) an end to all kinds of terrorism. The 1982 study also concludes that (1) internal economic, social, and political reforms; a resolution of the Palestinian problem; and an end to external interventions are essential to resolving the Lebanese crisis; and (2) the greatest threat to stability in the Middle East and to the unimpeded flow of oil to the West arises from the unresolved Arab-PalestinianIsraeli conflict. The book contains profound discussions and critical analyses of both Russian and American policies. It warns that American interests have been hurt by American tendencies to subordinate Middle Eastern issues to the United States-Soviet conflict; to try to resolve political problems through the use of force; and to ignore the local roots of many problems and the interests and needs of the peoples in the area. Not only American policymakers but all concerned Americans would benefit greatly from reading this well-researched and informative book. Khalil Nakhleh and Clifford Wright, fellows at the Institute for Arab Studies, explain that the purpose of their study is to discuss and analyze Israeli and American policies and the constraints that affected these in the period from August 1982 through April 1983, in the hope of being able to shed some light on the meaning of the "Palestine-Israel War" of 1982. A follow-up analysis of Arab and Palestinian policies and constraints during this same period would ultimately be covered in another book. Using primarily Israeli newspaper sources, Khalil Nakhleh wrote the chapter dealing with Israel. He examines not only Israeli objectives in initiating the invasion of Lebanon, but also the consequences of the invasion to Israel, Lebanon, and the PLO. Further, he discusses the internal developments within Israel before, during, and after the 1982 war and provides a useful, detailed account of the negotiations leading to the sighing of the Israeli-Lebanese withdrawal agreement. Clifford Wright, using primarily American newspaper sources, examines the United States policies during the period covered, with great stress on the Reagan Peace Plan and Arab, Palestinian, and Israeli reactions to it. 396 Reviews While the ground covered is fairly well known, the book can be useful—especially to the general reader—because most of the material, being derived from Western and Israeli sources, is presented in a relatively factual manner. However, because the authors are clearly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, there is some partiality, especially in their analyses, where they are much more critical of Israel, the United States, and even the Arab states than they are of the Palestinians and the PLO. Although one might find some other flaws in the study (for example, the split that developed in the Israeli consensus as a result of the 1982 war has been much deeper than the authors have indicated), it would be difficult to fault their final conclusions—that a "peaceful solution to the conflict is now further away than ever before" (p. 126). There is a helpful appendix but no index or bibliography. Using a wide range of primary and secondary sources in English, plus some Arab newspapers, Mohammed Shadid, Political Science Professor at An Najah National University in Nablus, revised a Ph.D. dissertation at Georgetown University to provide a detailed study of the history of American policies in relation to the Palestinian problem from World War I to 1980. After discussing briefly in the first chapter the Palestinians as a people and the rise of Palestinian nationalism, the author examines American policies on the Palestinian issues as they went through various phases. For years after the 1948 war the United States looked upon this issue merely as one of refugees and sought to resolve it by economic means in the hope that this would help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. After 1967, the United States considered the PLO a terrorist group and tried to ignore the Palestinian nationalist aspect, while seeking an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. After 1970 the United States finally began to concede that there could be no lasting peace in the Middle East without dealing with the legitimate national interests and rights of the Palestinians in some way—even if this excluded providing for an independent state. The author claims that American failure to resolve the Palestinian question was due to a "failure not only of policy, but also of understanding" (p. 13) and to an unwillingness to apply effective pressures on Israel. While quite fairly discussing and analyzing American mistakes and shortcomings, the author is less critical of Arab and Palestinian mistakes and shortcomings. In addition, his discussions are too brief in dealing with such important topics as (I) when, why, and how the PLO began to consider the possibility of accepting a smaller state and to stress diplomatic and political efforts over armed struggle; (2) the roles of Russia, Western Europe, and Japan; and (3) the effects of Begin's hardline policies on American public opinion. Nevertheless, this detailed and well-documented study, with its useful bibliography and appendix, should help contribute to a better understanding (on the part of both specialists and nonspecialists) of American views and policies on the Palestinian problem. In another detailed and highly documented study based on many official documents, memoirs, interviews, and other sources (almost wholly Western and Israeli, and rarely Arab) Saada Touval, Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, examines the roles of various third-party mediators of the Arab-Israeli conflict—including.Count Folke Bernadotte, Ralph Bunche, the U.N. Conciliation Commission, Robert Anderson, Gunnar Jarring, a 1971 mission of various African heads of state, Secretaries of State William Rogers and Henry Kissinger, and President Jimmy Carter—in an attempt to provide a framework for a comparative analysis of mediation attempts. Reviews 397 The author draws some important conclusions. For example, the stronger adversary prefers direct negotiations (where it hopes to gain maximum benefit from its superior bargaining position) to mediation, while the weaker adversary prefers third-party intervention in the hope of compensating for its weaker position. An American mediator with considerable resources available to apply any needed pressures or incentives has a better chance to succeed than a mediator for a weak U.N. One especially significant conclusion is that a mediator need not be impartial to be acceptable and successful—and most of the mediators discussed in the book were not perceived by one party or another as being impartial—because an adversary might, after weighing realistically less preferable alternatives, decide that it has more to gain than to lose from accepting such a mediator. While this conclusion is a valid one, the author fails also to examine adequately some of the major drawbacks to partiality in a mediator—especially since elsewhere he stressed the importance of having confidence in a mediator. Having also rightly concluded that the more comprehensive the scope of an agreement the more difficult it would be to achieve an agreement, the author then unquestioningly supports the step-by-step approach to resolving the overall Arab-Israeli conflict without seriously trying to discuss and analyze the major disadvantages to this approach that many specialists warned about. A step-by-step process is appropriate only if it actually facilitates the ultimate attainment of an overall settlement. But what if, by achieving progress in one area, a mediator ends up making it more difficult than ever to achieve progress in other major areas under dispute? Even the author concedes that Begin agreed to give up the Sinai only in order to make it easier for Israel to refuse to make concessions on the Palestinian and other territorial issues (see p. 288)—and, thereby, adding even greater obstacles to the attainment of a comprehensive settlement. The author should have examined and evaluated all aspects of this important matter. The book is especially valuable in providing a better understanding of mediation as a process for the pacific settlement of disputes and in drawing some important conclusions that could be useful to those contemplating future mediation. However, it is less useful and reliable as a study of Arab-Israeli relations because, especially in the earlier chapters, it too often presents a rather partisan Israel perspective of these relations. Villanova University FRED J. KHOURI HARRY S. ALLEN and IVAN VOLGYES, eds., Israel, the Middle East, and U.S. Interests (New York: Praeger, 1983). Pp. 179. MARI ON MUSHKAT, ed., Violence and Peace-Building in the Middle East (Munich, New York, London, Paris: K. G. Saur, 1981). Pp. 192. STEVEN L. SPIEGEL, ed., The Middle East and the Western Alliance (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982). Pp. 252. EDWARD BERNARD GLICK, The Triangular Connection: America, Israel, and American Jews (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982). Pp. 174. DAN TSCHIRGI, The Politics of Indecision: Origins and Implications of American Involvement with the Palestine Problem, Praeger Special Studies (New York: Praeger, 1983). Pp. 358.